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The Bleeding Edge: Theranos and the
Growing Risk of an Unregulated Private
Securities Market
Theodore O’Brien*
America’s securities laws and regulations, most of which were
created in the early twentieth century, are increasingly irrelevant
to the most dynamic emerging companies. Today, companies with
sufficient investor interest can raise ample capital through private
and exempt offerings, all while eschewing the public exchanges
and the associated burdens of the initial public offering, public
disclosures, and regulatory scrutiny. Airbnb, Inc., for example,
quickly tapped private investors for $1 billion in April of 2020,1
adding to the estimated $4.4 billion the company had previously
raised.2 The fundamental shift from public to private companies
is evidenced by the so-called “unicorns,” the more than 400
private companies valued at more than $1 billion. unicorns like
Uber, Airbnb, SpaceX, and WeWork have raised billions of
dollars without the need to tap retail investors through the public
exchanges. The unicorn phenomenon is emblematic of the shift
away from public markets, with more and more companies
choosing to stay private and raise capital through private
placements. Despite a fast-evolving capital market, America’s
*
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1

Airbnb, Silver Lake, Sixth Street Partners Invest $1 Billion in Airbnb, (Apr. 6,
2020, 4:24 p.m.) https://news.airbnb.com/silver-lake-sixth-street-partners-invest1-billion-in-airbnb/.
2
Deirdre Bosa and Lauren Feiner, CNBC, Airbnb is Listening to Investment
Pitches Despite a Large Cash Pile and Down Market, (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/19/airbnb-is-listening-to-investment-pitchesdespite-large-cash.html.
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securities regulations are still largely based on the 1930s-era
laws passed in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Scholars
and regulators have voiced concerns about the lack of regulation
in the private markets and the potential harms posed by large,
unregulated private companies.
At its peak, blood-testing company Theranos was a unicorn,
valued at $9 billion. The valuation reflected intense investor
enthusiasm for a company with significant potential to shake up
the biotechnology and healthcare industries. Far from realizing
its financial and business goals, Theranos perpetrated a fraud on
investors, customers, and business partners. Executives misled
current and prospective investors with inflated financial
projections. The company’s founder and employees deceived
business partners with falsified product tests. The company
continued to tout its “revolutionary” blood testing technology,
but, behind the scenes, employees consistently failed to achieve
the necessary technological breakthroughs. Rather than admit the
setbacks, Theranos deviated from established medical and
scientific methods by altering tests and, when that did not work,
Theranos ran the tests on its rivals’ status quo blood testing
machines. Eventually, intrepid reporters, regulators, and
prosecutors uncovered the fraud, culminating in a series of
lawsuits brought by investors, business partners, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
In the aftermath, many commentators wondered how a critically
flawed company could raise so much money from prominent
investors at such a high valuation. Theranos was able to
perpetrate its fraud, in part, because it operated as a private
company and therefore did not have to submit to the same onerous
disclosures that public companies must provide to the SEC and
the investing public. A public company, unlike Theranos, must
register with state and federal regulators, submit periodic filings,
and, importantly, certify its financials under Sarbanes-Oxley.
Theranos was able to raise $700 million without providing those
disclosures to its investors—disclosures that were designed to
protect and inform investors. The Theranos story provides a lens
through which we see the tension between private capital
formation and protection of investors.
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In this Note, I closely examine the Theranos collapse and the
litigation that continues in its aftermath. This Note will argue that
Theranos should be viewed as an example of regulatory failure.
Current securities regulations allow private companies to operate
in the shadows, even while these companies raise large sums from
sophisticated and (increasingly) unsophisticated investors alike
with little oversight and minimal transparency. This Note
examines Theranos as a cautionary tale exemplifying the risks of
failing to regulate private companies despite the dramatic decline
in IPOs and the corresponding expansion of private companies,
particularly unicorns.
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 406
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I. INTRODUCTION
Retail investors learned a hard lesson when the dot-com bubble burst
in the early 2000s: it is common—even likely—to lose money investing
in startups. Experienced venture capital investors, of course, already knew
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that lesson well. But for many average investors, the hot initial public
offerings (“IPOs”) of the 1990s were their first foray into speculating on
technology companies and internet startups.
Today, venture capital investors accept the probability that most of
their investments will fail to materialize because they hope that a few
winners will become massively valuable companies.3 Indeed, academic
research suggests that most start-ups fail to achieve the projected return on
investment and 30 to 40 percent result in a complete loss for the investor.4
The high risks associated with start-up investments explain why legislators
and regulators have long sought to prevent unsophisticated retail investors
from investing in start-ups. For the most part, speculative early-stage
investments are reserved for venture capitalists, institutional investors, and
other accredited investors—at least until a start-up matures enough to
successfully navigate the IPO process. To tap the public markets, then,
companies must undergo the expensive and demanding initial public
offering process, disclosing the company’s financial information, risks,
and other important information.
The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)5 imposes certain
disclosure requirements on companies seeking a public offering “to
promote full and fair disclosure necessary for the investor to make an
informed investment decision.”6 President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed
the Securities Act into law as part of his administration’s response to the
stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. In the Roaring
Twenties, the American public enthusiastically bought into the soaring
economy, with more Americans investing in the stock market than ever

3

A common refrain in venture capital is that “Nine out of 10 startups fail.”
Although that statistic appears largely anecdotal and does not reflect the true
startup failure rate, similarly high failure rates are often cited by venture
capitalists to show the high risk associated with investing in startups. Erin
Griffith, Conventional Wisdom Says 90% of Startups Fail. Data Says Otherwise.
FORTUNE (June 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/27/startup-advice-datafailure/.
4
Research by Harvard Business School’s Shikhar Ghosh estimates that between
70 to 80 percent of start-ups fail to meet the projected return on investment and
30 to 40 percent of start-ups end in a complete loss for the investor. See, Carmen
Nobel, Why Companies Fail—and How Their Founders Can Bounce Back,
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 11, 2019, 6:29 PM),
https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/why-companies-failand-how-their-founders-canbounce-back.
5
15 U.S.C. § 77 (2018).
6
See JIM BARTOS, UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 7
(2006).
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before—a development that made the crash all the more devastating.7 In
an effort to reassure the investing public, Roosevelt signed a series of bills
into law that reworked the securities markets.8 This marked a sea change
that transformed American securities law “from a system of caveat emptor
to one of caveat vendor,” requiring companies to make substantial
disclosures before offering stock.9
The Securities Act imposes these disclosure requirements on all
securities and bars all transactions in unregistered securities, unless there
is an exemption.10 Per the SEC’s website, the Securities Act accomplishes
two primary goals: (1) make available to investors financial and other
information related to the securities being offered, and (2) “prohibit deceit,
misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.”11 To go
public, a company must complete a complicated, expensive, and timeconsuming IPO process.12 If successful, the issuer must continue to
comply with reporting and disclosure requirements or face reprisal from
shareholders or the SEC.13
The Securities Act carves out three primary exemptions from the
Securities Act’s registration provisions: § 3 excludes certain categories of
securities from registration; § 4 exempts various transactions from
registration; and § 28 grants the SEC the power to make rules that expand
the statutory exemptions.14 Federal securities laws and regulations
effectively set a dividing line between “public” securities (those securities
that are offered to the public and traded on exchanges like the New York

7

ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL 7 (2000).
See EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM
TO MADOFF 250-52 (2017) (describing the context of the New Deal-era
securities reforms).
9
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (3d ed. 2011).
10
15 U.S. Code § 77e (2018); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 104 (2016).
11
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 1, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html#secact1933.
12
See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, CONSIDERING AN IPO TO
FUEL YOUR COMPANY’S FUTURE? INSIGHT INTO THE COSTS OF GOING PUBLIC AND
BEING PUBLIC 3-20 (Nov. 2017),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/cost-of-an-ipo.pdf.
13
See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 48 Stat.
881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.) (“Exchange Act”)
(providing the statutory basis for SEC rules requiring public companies to file
current, quarterly, and annual reports).
14
Id.
8
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Stock Exchange) and “private” securities (those securities and transactions
that are exempt from registration).
As will be discussed in Part II, going public requires a company to
fulfill the Securities Act registration requirements and submit periodic
reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).15 In
contrast, private companies and those securities otherwise exempted from
SEC registration do not need to fulfill either requirement, allowing these
companies to avoid the costly and sometimes invasive public disclosure
system. Companies were historically willing to endure the expense and
lack of privacy because going public offered a significant advantage,
namely accessing the public markets. Over time, the calculus has changed;
private placements now account for more capital raised in the United
States than publicly registered stock offerings.16 Today, even some of the
largest and most dynamic companies choose to stay private as long as
possible.17
There are many possible explanations for why companies elect to
delay a public offering,18 but, whatever the cause, the maturation of the
private securities market has made the decision to stay private easier and
more efficient than ever before. Private securities sales often involve
several problems: “high transaction costs and information costs, including
difficulties matching buyers and sellers, a lack of information requiring
extensive due diligence, and the costs of negotiating and papering
transactions.”19 In the 2000s, electronic marketplaces began facilitating
purchases and sales of shares in private companies, including then-popular
start-ups like Facebook and LinkedIn.20 These electronic marketplaces
15

15 U.S.C. § 78 (2018).
See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the
Decline of the Public Company, 68 Hastings L.J. 445, 472 (2017) (“Publicly
registered stock offerings now represent only a minor share of the capital raised
in the United States. The vast majority of U.S. corporate capital is raised instead
as debt or as privately placed equity. In particular, private placements of
corporate capital (both equity and debt) have rapidly overtaken public offerings,
and the gap is only increasing.”)
17
See infra Part II; see also Amy Deen Westbrook & David A.
Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and the Concentration of the U.S. Equity
Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 688, 717 (2018) (“As the private market has grown,
the public offering market has shrunk. In turn, there has been a marked drop-off
in initial public offerings (IPOs).”).
18
See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 17, at 717.
19
Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 37
(2012).
20
Douglas MacMillan and Ari Levy, LinkedIn Said to Be Worth Almost $3
Billion in Secondary Sale, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2011),
16
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improved efficiency in private transactions by connecting buyers and
sellers through a central location, publishing buy-sell bid pricing,
disseminating third-party research reports, and providing standardized
contracts.21 Investment funds, institutional investors, venture capitalists,
wealthy individuals, and even mutual funds can now efficiently buy up
shares of private companies.22 The increasingly liquid market for private
securities, in turn, relieved pressure on companies to go public because
shareholders—typically early investors, employees, and management—
could sell their shares at attractive prices quickly, legally, and without
much effort. The growth of the private securities market coincides with
the “‘retailization’ of private investment funds, whereby retail investors
are increasingly able to participate in private side investments either
directly or through mutual funds.”23
Many scholars have warned that this evolution poses serious risks to
the public.24 But, for all the many private companies that have
disappointed investors, there are few examples where the harm extended
beyond venture capitalists and employees. Perhaps the lack of serious, farreaching harm explains why there has been little to no regulatory or
legislative attention paid to this issue. After all, until recently, there were
no massive frauds or collapses involving unicorns that would have raised
public or governmental concern. Then, Theranos collapsed. The blood
testing company evolved from classic Silicon Valley start-up to a mediacharming, seemingly revolutionary company with a multi-billion-dollar
valuation, before finally imploding amid myriad lawsuits, questions about
its technology, and federal prosecutors accusing the company and its
executives of fraud. Venture capitalists were not the only victims of the
fraud: corporate partners lost significant millions of dollars when the
partnerships collapsed; individuals suffered investment losses because the
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-01-21/linkedin-said-to-beworth-almost-3-billion-in-secondary-sale.
21
Ibrahim, supra note 20, at 38.
22
See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 17, at 724 (“[T]he private market is
inhabited not only by wealthy individuals . . . but by a menagerie of vehicles
such as venture capital funds, private equity, corporate venture capital, hedge
funds, sovereign wealth funds, mutual fund complexes, and family offices.
Multiple types of private investors make it possible to have ‘[e]arly stage
VCs selling to Growth Equity Investors selling to Mutual Funds and Sovereign
Wealth Funds.’) (quoting Amie Hutchinson, Why Are More Companies Staying
Private?, GOODWIN (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/hutchinson-goodwin-presentationacsec-021517.pdf.).
23
de Fontenay, supra note 17, at 468.
24
See infra Part IV.
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funds in which they invested owned Theranos shares; and Theranos’ faulty
testing delivered inaccurate results to the unsuspecting public.25
Before it was exposed as a fraud, Theranos raised $700 million from
private investors at ever-climbing valuations peaking at $9 billion.26 The
company offered its unreliable blood-testing to customers, leading to
confusion and fear by misdiagnosed patients. Theranos also misled
investors—from billionaire investors like Rupert Murdoch to hedge funds
and other institutional investors—with inaccurate projections and false
statements. The company did this by raising funds through several private
fundraising rounds over about a decade.27 Importantly, Theranos never
attempted to register as a public company, allowing the company to avoid
the type of financial and business disclosures that public companies
provide investors and the SEC. This Note argues that had Theranos
attempted to or completed an initial public offering, its many flaws would
have been exposed, quickening its demise and protecting the public.
Theranos is a dramatic example of the societal and market risks posed
by today’s unicorns. More broadly, Theranos is a useful case study
exposing vulnerabilities in modern securities regulations and, perhaps,
suggesting necessary reforms. This paper uses Theranos as a vehicle for
understanding: first, the current regulatory framework and how private
companies raise funds outside the public markets (Part II); second, the
scale of unicorns and problems posed by these companies (Part III); and
finally, third, whether proposed regulatory reforms would have prevented
(or at least detected) the Theranos fraud (Part IV). The solutions offered
to regulate the private securities market include increasing disclosure
requirements, requiring corporate executives to certify those disclosures,
and increasing transparency around private securities transactions.

25

See infra Part III, B.
Complaint at 11, SEC v. Holmes & Theranos Inc., No. 5:18-CV-01602, 2018
WL 1321981 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2018) (“From late 2013 to 2015, Holmes,
Balwani, and Theranos raised over $700 million from investors in two financing
rounds.”).
27
See White Decl. ¶ 6. (White, Theranos’ then-Corporate Counsel, explaining
“Theranos has instead raised money through private sales of stock to
sophisticated investors through several rounds of venture financing in five
different series of preferred stock: Series A Preferred stock; Series B Preferred
stock; Series C Preferred stock; Series C-1 Preferred stock; and Series C-2
Preferred stock. Different series of preferred stock have different liquidation
preferences. Series C, C-1, and C-2 Preferred are senior in preference to Series
A and B Preferred.”).
26
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II. MODERN SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE
GROWTH OF THE SECONDARY MARKET
A. The Opportunity and Costs of Going Public
If sunlight is the best disinfectant, then the initial public offering is the
market’s sunlight, forcing companies to shed light on their businesses,
finances, and risks.28 Congress designed this disclosure and registration
process back in the aftermath of the Stock Market Crash of 1929.
Following the crash, Congress publicly investigated Wall Street, most
famously the Pecora Commission hearings. The hearings shined a bright
light on deception and abuses on Wall Street, including material
misrepresentations by companies, unethical (if not illegal then) deception
by brokers, and outright false statements about companies’ assets and
financial health.29 Partly in response to the ugly practices uncovered by
congressional investigations, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933
to achieve “truth in securities,” which represented “a narrowly focused but
high-powered effort to assure full and fair disclosure on the special
occasion of a public offering.”30
While today fewer companies are choosing to go public, for the better
part of the last century, going public represented a significant (and
desirable) step in a company’s evolution. Public financing allows a
company to expand, increase its working capital, retire preexisting debt,
and give early investors and employees an opportunity to selling their
shares on the public market.31 Going public is also thought to increase a
company’s public profile and give it “an air of financial success,” helping
the company raise future funds, attract new employees, and gain a stronger
market position.32 The bargain, per federal securities legislation, is that in
exchange for access to the public markets, companies must disclose
material information necessary for investors to make an informed
decision.

28

LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
29
For a thorough review of the Pecora Commission’s work, see generally
MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW FERDINAND
PECORA'S INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN
FINANCE (2011).
30
Milton Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340
(1966).
31
HAZEN, supra note 10, at 74-75.
32
Id.
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Before a company lists on a public stock exchange, it must survive a
burdensome and revealing process of disclosing financial information.
The initial public offering process begins when the company hires an
investment bank to underwrite the offering. The managing underwriter
works with the issuer to navigate the due diligence process, determine the
offering price, and recruit additional underwriters to sell the shares to the
investing public.33 The underwriter performs a due diligence function,
too.34 Once the underwriting process begins, the company works with its
bank and legal team to navigate the necessary disclosures.
The IPO process is designed to give the public investors enough
information to make an informed decision on whether to purchase the
offered shares and to understand the risks associated with that decision.
The mandatory disclosure system requires the issuer to file a registration
statement.35 The statement must include a prospectus for potential
investors with material information about the company.36 A prospectus
responds to the required registration form items while delivering a
compelling narrative of the company. This reflects the competing demands
of a Registration Statement: to satisfy regulators and the skeptical investor
while ginning up interest in the offering. The issuer must describe the
company’s business and the securities being registered, explain how it will
use the proceeds generated from the sale, disclose pending legal
proceedings, detail any material transactions with insiders, and identify
principal investors, as well as directors and officers and their
compensation.37 Perhaps most important for investors—and most
worrying for issuers—are the required disclosures related to the
company’s financial health. The company must file a standard Form S-I
Registration Statement including financial statements, certain other
financial data, analysis of the company's financial condition, and
disclosures related to market risk.38 Furthermore, going public exposes the
issuer, its officers, and board of directors to potential civil and criminal
33

Katrina Ellis, Roni Michaely, and Maureen O'Hara, A Guide to the Initial
Public Offering Process, 1999 WL 35299857, 1.
34
Id.
35
Rigers Gjyshi, The Integrated Disclosure System, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 47, 49 (2014).
36
Id.; see also Form S-1 Registration Statement under the Securities Act of
1933, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-1.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
37
Carl W. Schneider, Joseph M. Manko, & Robert S. Kant, Going Public:
Practice, Procedure, and Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1981).
38
See Form S-1 Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/files/forms1.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
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liability for misrepresentations and omissions related to the issued
securities.39
In 2002, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 ("SOX") as a response to a wave of corporate accounting scandals.40
Whereas the pre-SOX regulatory regime largely left corporate governance
to the states and the companies, SOX brought corporate governance under
the federal securities regulation umbrella.41 SOX sought to improve
corporate governance by imposing a number of disclosure requirements,
setting criminal penalties for violations of securities laws, increasing
oversight on accounting and auditing, and ratcheting up accountability of
key corporate actors. For example, one SOX provision requires the public
company’s CEO and CFO to each certify the accuracy of financial
statements submitted to the SEC.42 This certification provides federal
regulators and prosecutors with a basis for enforcing securities regulations
when executives sign off on statements that fail to disclose fraud or include
material misrepresentations.43 With the increased requirements under
SOX, public companies must make extensive, regular disclosures and
stand by those statements under threat of criminal penalty.
Section 404 requires public companies to submit an annual report
detailing the procedures and adequacy of internal controls and financial
reporting processes.44 Section 404 also requires the company's outside
auditor to assess the effectiveness of those controls. Section 906 of the law
requires chief executive officers and chief financial officers to certify in
writing that the report “fully complies” with the applicable provisions in
the Exchange Act and, most importantly, that the report “fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of

39

See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving A New Path to Equity Capital and
Share Liquidity, 50 B.C.L. REV. 639, 643-47 (2009) (discussing myriad
provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act under which companies,
executives, and directors may be civilly or criminally liable).
40
See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1544 (2005) (criticizing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the circumstances surrounding its drafting and
passage).
41
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 1:22
(2002).
42
Byron F. Egan, Major Themes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, TEX. J. BUS. L.,
339, 376 (2008).
43
Id. at 380 (discussing enforcement actions based on false certifications).
44
Id.
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the issuer.”45 Executives who willfully certify a non-compliant report face
fines of up to $5 million and up to twenty years in prison.46
Before SOX, the process of going public came at a significant cost to
the company, in fees to advisors and staff hours spent preparing documents
and navigating the process. Once the company lists on a public exchange,
the costs continue with regular disclosure and reporting requirements and
responding to public investors and analysts.47 Today, complying with
reporting requirements are even greater under SOX.48 The risks are also
significantly greater for companies and corporate executives: a
misstatement could expose corporate executives to criminal prosecution.
Faced with this daunting process and heightened compliance risks, large
private companies increasingly seek to put off the IPO as long as possible,
if the company ever registers at all.49

B. The Decline in IPOs and the Rise of Unicorns
For many of today’s biggest and most promising companies, the
public markets offer few rewards that cannot also be obtained through
private fundraising. There are many theories for why companies are
increasingly eschewing the public stock market in favor of staying private.
Whatever the reason(s), since 2000, the number of companies going public
in the U.S. has declined.50
45

18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).
Id.; see Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs
Gone? The Hard Life of the Small IPO, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 88 (2016).
47
Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 17, at 720-21 (discussing the high costs
associated with the average company’s initial public offering, particularly in the
twenty-first century).
48
See generally William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After SarbanesOxley: The Irony of "Going Private", 55 EMORY L.J. 141 (2006).
49
See id. at 718–19 (“Diminishing public companies have been exacerbated by
the growing trend for companies to delay their public offering. For example, the
average age of U.S. technology companies that went public in 1999 was four
years. In 2014, it was eleven years.”).
50
See Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs
Gone?, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1690 (2013) (“During
1980-2000, an average of 310 IPOs occurred each year in the United States, but
this has fallen to an average of only 99 IPOs per year during 2001-2012. Even
more dramatically, an average of 165 small-company (pre-inflation-adjusted
annual sales of less than $50 million) IPOs occurred each and this number has
dropped by more than 80% to an average of only 28 per year during 20012012.”); see also de Fontenay, supra note 17, at 454-58 (summarizing the
decline in exchange listings).
46
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In trying to explain the decline in IPOs, some have also pointed
specifically to Sarbanes-Oxley as the culprit, arguing that the 2002 law
puts too much of an organizational and financial strain on public
companies. 51 There is evidence that SOX dampened interest in going
public and imposed real costs on public companies. But legislative
changes alleviated some of the burdens Sarbanes-Oxley placed on
companies.52
Other theories explaining the drop in IPOs include: economies of
scope and economies of scale driving corporate acquisitions of smaller
companies,53 declining analyst coverage of public companies, market
conditions, the perception that public companies are more likely to be
sued, the decimalization of stock prices, and changes by the SEC to rules
regulating brokerage activity.54 Whatever the cause of declining in IPOs,
one thing is certain: companies are staying private longer and raising more
capital through the private markets.55
The uncomfortable consequence of this shift is that more and more
investor capital is flowing to private companies that are not subject to the
same disclosure requirements as public companies. Companies can
operate in “stealth mode,” raising millions of dollars from investors
without sharing the type of information that the Securities Act requires.56
Many scholars have called attention to the growth of the private
investment market and suggested possible reforms to address this sea
change.57 But rather than regulate this fast-growing market, as discussed
51

Rose, supra note 47, at 88.
Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 51, at 1665 (“Following concerns that the
implementation of [Sarbanes-Oxley], especially Section 404, was imposing
excessive costs on small public companies, in June 2007 the SEC revised some
of the rules, lessening the burdens on small companies.”).
53
Id. at 1690 (theorizing that the decline in IPOs is primarily due to increased
“importance of bringing products to market quickly” and because “greater value
is created in a sale to a strategic buyer in the same or a related industry.”).
54
See Rose, supra note 37, at 90-95.
55
See, generally, de Fontenay, supra note 17, at 445.
56
See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 17, at 696 (“[B]ecause the capital
structure of private placements is, by definition, private, such firms are able to
avoid complying with the disclosure regime under which public companies
operate”).
57
Adi Osovsky, The Curious Case of the Secondary Market with Respect to
Investor Protection, 82 TENN. L. REV. 83 (2014); Bret Leone-Quick, Who's That
Peeking in My Window: SEC Scrutiny of Private Companies, 26 SEC. LITIG. 27
(2016); Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 174-77 (2017) (discussing the impact of regulations in creating unicorns
and the Secondary Market); Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and
52
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in the following section, regulators and Congress have focused on
loosening existing regulations and expanding exemptions.

C. Legislation Continues to Expand Exemptions
Of the many factors that contributed to the growth in the market for
pre-IPO investments, legislation is probably the most impactful. For most
of the twentieth century, companies had a significant incentive to go
public: early investors, founders, and employees wanted to cash in on their
shares of the company. The SEC restricted when and under what
conditions start-up company shareholders could transfer their stock.58
The registration requirement was not without exceptions. Most
significantly, the Securities Act allows companies to sell its unregistered
securities to “accredited investors” under Rule 506 of Regulation D.59 The
Securities Act defines accredited investors as including: certain financial
institutions, such as banks, savings and loan associations, registered broker
dealers, insurance companies, retirement plans, and insurance companies;
qualifying business development companies and partnerships; the issuer's
corporate executives and directors; trusts with total assets of more than $5
million; and individuals who meet specific net worth and income
requirements.60 Regulation D carved out a number of exemptions from
registration for qualifying issues and issuers.61
Over time, the SEC continued to relax restrictions on private
placements, adopting Rule 144, which allows investors to sell stock after
two years with certain conditions attached. Or, an investor could wait three
years and sell the stock without any restrictions.62 The SEC decided that
even that rule was too burdensome and whittled down the rule until it was
little more than a minor inconvenience for investors, who may now sell
stock under Rule 144 without any restrictions after just one year. This
regulatory rollback made it possible for companies like Facebook, Google,
Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1011-24 (2015) (discussing Rule
144A trading platforms and the factors that contributed to the growth of the
Secondary Market).
58
See Jones, supra note 58, at 174.
59
17 C.F.R. § § 230.501-230.508 (2018).
60
Generally, an individual qualifies as an accredited investor if she has a
personal net worth (or a joint net worth with her spouse) of more than $1 million
or earned an individual income of more than $200,000 (or $300,000, if
combined with a spouse) in the past two years and expects to earn the same in
the current year. 17 C.F.R. §230.501(5)-(6) (2018).
61
17 C.F.R. § § 230.501-230.508 (2018).
62
See Jones, supra note 43, at 174.
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and the unicorns of today to satisfy the liquidity demands of their
employees and shareholders, greatly reducing the need for a public
offering.
Yet some unicorns still outgrew even these broadened exemptions; in
2012, Facebook went public to avoid surpassing the maximum record
shareholder limit.63 Partly to aid future unicorns following in Facebook’s
footsteps, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“the
JOBS Act”).64 The 2012 law “widen[ed] the space within which
companies could stay outside the Act's regulatory reach and creat[ed] a
new category of emerging growth companies that can avoid a number of
the Act's regulatory requirements during the first years after an IPO”—
and, of course, quadrupled the number of record shareholders allowed so
that future companies would, unlike Facebook, not necessarily have to go
public.65

D. The Investing Public Meets Private Offerings
Regulatory rollback and the steady expansion of exemptions have
helped make it possible for companies to raise mountains of cash through
private offerings. As the private market grows, retail investors are
increasingly investing (however indirectly) in these private startups,
belying the myth that startups are the exclusive reserve for sophisticated,
mostly institutional investors.66 In fact, a recent study suggests that the
majority of the buyers and sellers in these transactions are individuals.67
One reason for this development is that technology has made buying
and selling shares of private companies easier than ever before. Online
63

Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 338
(2013).
64
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, PL 112-106, April 5, 2012, 126 Stat 306
(April 5, 2012).
65
Id. at 342; see de Fontenay, supra note 17, at 460.
66
See Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A Case Study of
Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in unicorns (and Other Startups) and the
Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C.L. REV. 1341, 1349.
67
David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, and Edward Watts, Cashing it in: PrivateCompany Exchanges and Employee Stock Sales Prior to IPO, STANFORD
CLOSER LOOK SERIES (Sep. 12, 2018), (“Individuals make up the largest portion
of both the buyer and seller populations in our sample. Individuals comprise 87
percent of the known-seller population, based on total transaction dollar
amounts; institutions only 13 percent . . . . Seventy-four percent of known
buyers are individuals, based on transaction dollar amounts . . . .”).
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exchanges like Second Market (now NASDAQ Private Market) and
SharesPost offer investors real-time data, valuation information, and a
platform through which investors can buy shares from company insiders.
From 2013 through December 17, 2019, NASDAQ Private Market
“facilitated secondary liquidity for over 33,000 shareholders, returning
over $23 [billion] of value back to founders, employees and institutional
investors.”68 That amount does not include the shares sold on other
exchanges or outside any exchange through private transactions.
Remarkably, any individual with a few thousand dollars can invest in
private startups using an investment fund. In 2014, for example,
SharesPost launched its SharesPost 100 Fund that provides unaccredited
individuals with a way to invest in pre-IPO companies. For just $2500, an
individual can purchase Class A Shares of the SharesPost 100 Fund, a
continuously offered closed-end fund that “seeks capital appreciation by
focusing on investments in late-stage, venture-backed private
companies.”69
Individuals also invest indirectly in startups through common
investment vehicles like mutual funds and retirement funds, which have
increasingly invested in private companies.70 But it is unclear whether
mutual fund investors appreciate the significant risks associated with
startup investments—or whether they are even aware that the fund invests
in emerging companies.71 Some mutual funds have already had to make
significant write downs on their startup investments.72 This is troubling

68

MARKETINSIGHT, “Q&A with Nasdaq Private Market on Secondary Sales of
Private Company Stock, NASDAQ,” (Dec. 18, 2019 3:31 PM),
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/qa-with-nasdaq-private-market-on-secondarysales-of-private-company-stock-2019-12-17
69
SharesPost, Investment Strategy, (Dec. 18, 2019, 4:46 PM),
https://sharespost.com/marketplace/individual-investors/buying-privateassets/sharespost-100-fund/strategy-and-investor-information/.
70
Schwartz, supra note 67, at 1349 (“It is only recently that mutual funds have
shown interest in putting their enormous resources behind emerging firms.
Funds from the largest families, including Vanguard, Fidelity, and Blackrock,
have lately begun steering investor assets toward unicorns. Allocations have
risen sharply over the last few years and now total over $ 10 billion spread
across over 250 funds, with Fidelity's funds leading the way. And while nascent
statistics focus on unicorn investments, other startups might be on fund ledgers
as well.”).
71
Id. at 1354–55 (discussing the problem of mutual funds failing to inform
unsuspecting investors that the fund invests in startups).
72
Heather Somerville and Tim McLaughlin, Fidelity marks down stake in preIPO startups Cloudera, Dropbox, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2016),
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because some of the largest mutual fund companies, like T. Rowe Price,
Fidelity, and Blackrock, are pooling these startup investments into popular
mutual funds that make up many Americans’ 401(k)’s and individual
retirement accounts.73
But the SEC, far from concerned, believes retail investors should have
more access to private offerings. In a speech to the Economic Club of New
York, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton told the audience that the SEC was
exploring “whether appropriately structured funds can facilitate Main
Street investor access to private investments . . . .”74 In Chairman Clayton’s
view, the SEC “should . . . increase the type and quality of opportunities
for our Main Street investors in our private markets.”75
The incredible collapse of Theranos shows how loosely regulated
private companies pose a serious threat to investors and the public
generally. As press reports and investor lawsuits have shown, Theranos’
harm extended to myriad diverse stakeholders including: patients that used
Theranos’ blood tests; institutional investors, such as hedge funds, a
mutual fund company, and a sovereign wealth fund; Theranos’ employees;
and corporate partners, such as Walgreens and Safeway, and those
companies’ shareholders. The widespread harm suggests that the SEC
should more tightly regulate private companies and reconsider its efforts
to encourage retail investment in private offerings.76

III. THERANOS’ ASCENT AND THE PUBLIC HARM
A. A Silicon Valley Star is Born
In 2004, Elizabeth Holmes dropped out of Stanford University’s
School of Engineering to start a company she believed would
revolutionize blood testing. Holmes, who lacked significant medical or
scientific experience, wanted to perform a battery of more than 200 tests
using only a few drops of blood—far less blood than the industry standard
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-fidelity-ipo/fidelity-marks-downstake-in-pre-ipo-startups-cloudera-dropbox-idUSKCN0WW1EO;
73
David Gelles and Conor Dougherty, Americans’ Retirement Funds
Increasingly Contain Tech Start-Up Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2015)
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/business/dealbook/tech-money-sendsfunds-on-the-hunt-for-unicorns.html.
74
Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Remarks to the Economic Club of New York
(Sept. 9, 2019).
75
Id.
76
See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private
Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 584 (2016)
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blood testing equipment used. She ignored warnings from experts like
Stanford medical professor Phyllis Gardner, who advised the young
entrepreneur that her blood testing idea was not medically possible, and
her own engineers who laid out the technical obstacles.77 Undeterred,
Holmes developed a blood testing device, Edison, that she claimed
performed more than 240 faster than competing devices and with less
blood.78 But, in 2014, several years after Theranos launch, Edison only
performed 15 tests and even those few tests were often inaccurate.79 Under
pressure to deliver the “breakthrough technology” that she had promised,
Holmes tried to mask its failures by having Theranos perform tests on its
competitors’ traditional machines and hiding inaccurate test results.80
In many ways, Theranos epitomized the typical Silicon Valley startup. Nowhere is that more clear than with Holmes, a brash young founder
of the Steve Jobs-archetype, hocking a (largely unproven) vision for
revolutionizing not just an entire industry, but the whole world. As the
company’s public profile grew, however, Holmes’ lofty idea of offering
faster, less intrusive, and more comprehensive blood testing failed to
materialize. The company faced myriad problems, including infighting
among managers, a hostile workplace, product delays, regulatory issues,
and seemingly insurmountable technological challenges.81 As a private
company, Theranos managed to keep much of its troubles from the public,
even as Theranos began offering its unreliable blood-testing to
unsuspecting customers.

B. Private Investors Pour Money into the Company
Theranos’ struggles to deliver on its lofty promises did not dampen
investors’ excitement about the company’s technology.82 Starting around
2010, when Theranos filed a notice that it sold $45 million shares,83 the
77

JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY
STARTUP 218-19 (2018).
78
John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled With Its Blood-Test
Technology, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16. 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggled-with-blood-tests1444881901.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
See Luke Timmerman, Theranos Raises $45M for Personalized Medicine,
XCONOMY (July 8, 2010), https://xconomy.com/sanfrancisco/2010/07/08/theranos-raises-45m-for-personalized-medicine/.
83
Form Regulation D filed by Theranos, Inc., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, (July 8, 2010) available at
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fledgling company shaped a myth about its product and the technological
advances it represented. In the ensuing years, Theranos managed to fool
investors, customers, its board, regulators, and much of the press, taking
the usual Silicon Valley attitude of “fake it till you make it”84 to
unprecedented heights of deception.
Theranos did not inform its investors about the company’s poor
financial health and early investors continued to pour more money into the
company at ever-higher valuations. Critically, as a private company,
Theranos did not need to make regular disclosures to the SEC, and the
company’s financials were not subject to the type of scrutiny public
companies endure. The company provided investors with some evidence
of the company’s success by way of marketing materials, investor
presentations, product demos, and meetings with executives; the company
also disclosed some information through its Form D filings. But, for the
most part, as a private company Theranos was not required to share much
information with investors, even as the company took in hundreds of
millions of dollars.85 When Theranos did share information with investors,
Holmes and the company’s president and COO, Sunny Balwani, created
financial projections that were extremely optimistic and had no basis in
reality.86
Notably, Theranos achieved its remarkable $9 billion valuation
through a fundraising round in which the company offered investors
financial projections that were “five- to twelvefold” higher than its internal
projections.87 Most public companies of Theranos’ size have a chief
financial officer (CFO), or similar executive, who oversees the company’s
finances and can provide investors with a picture of the company’s
financial health. But Theranos fired its CFO in 2006 and never hired a real
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1313697/000131369710000004/xslFo
rmDX01/primary_doc.xml.
84
Erin Griffith, Theranos and Silicon Valley’s ‘Fake It Till You Make It’
Culture, WIRED.COM (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/theranosand-silicon-valleys-fake-it-till-you-make-it-culture/.
85
Theranos was uniquely credible in its argument that it could provide only
limited information to investors and the inquiring public. Theranos jealously
guarded its proprietary technology, which seemed reasonable given that the
company was seeking to revolutionize a highly competitive biotechnology
industry.
86
On February 4, 2014, a hedge fund purchased $96 million worth of Theranos
stock at $17 a share, setting the company’s valuation at $9 billion. Balwani
induced the hedge fund executives to buy the stock by sending a spreadsheet
with financial projections that were multiples of Theranos’ own internal
projections. See, CARREYROU, supra note 78, at 182 (2018).
87
Id. at 182-83.
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replacement. Danise Yam, a “corporate controller” at Theranos, was the
closest approximation to the critical CFO role, but she had little
responsibility for the company’s finances and her financial projections
were overly inflated. Balwani surpassed even those rosy projections,
creating revenue and profit projections “from whole cloth.”88 Balwani
persuaded a hedge fund, Partner Fund Management, to invest $96 million
by fabricating financial data and grossly misrepresenting the capabilities
of Theranos’ blood testing technology.89 Partner Fund’s investment valued
the company at $9 billion.90
This deception probably would not have been possible if Theranos was
a public company. If Theranos filed for an initial public offering, the
company would engage an investment bank that would, in turn, conduct
an extensive due diligence process. The bank would pour over financial
data and scrutinize Balwani's fabricated numbers. Legal counsel and
auditing firms would similarly examine the company's books and make
sure that Theranos provided investors with a realistic picture of the
company's financial health and risks.
Theranos' registration statement would include a prospectus that
provides potential investors with all material information about the
company. Theranos would need to disclose pending legal proceedings, of
which there were many given Theranos' proclivity for legal action against
reporters, rivals, and its own employees. The registration statement would
include an S-1 filing, complete with the company's financial data and
disclosures of material risk. It is unlikely that auditors and banks would
accept Yam and Balwani's inflated figures. Further, it is unclear whether
those executives would have made those misrepresentations if they had to
certify the accuracy of the financial statements under threat of criminal
prosecution, like public company executives must do under SOX.

C. Others Fail to Recognize Theranos’ Fraud
The technology industry, the press, and regulators also largely
accepted Holmes’ story at face value. Theranos’ largely compliant
board—made up of highly accomplished business, military, and
government leaders—rarely questioned Holmes.91 Government regulators,
for the most part, failed to uncover the extensive compliance problems in
Theranos’ laboratories—despite numerous inspections of the facilities.
88

CARREYROU, supra note 78, at 182.
Id. at 179-183.
90
Id. at 183.
89
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For a close examination of corporate governance and board failures at
unicorns, See Jones, supra note 58, at 165.
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Although some reporters raised questions about the company,92 several
media outlets published fawning coverage regurgitating Holmes’ claims
about what the company had accomplished.93 Starting in 2015, reporters
started seriously investigating the company’s technology and whether the
supposedly revolutionary blood tests could deliver on the myriad promises
made by CEO Elizabeth Holmes.94
While many of Holmes’ claims regarding the technology can be
chalked up to the boundless (and often baseless) optimism that infects
many of Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurs, Holmes blatantly deceived her
audience at critical moments in the company’s rise. For example, when a
blood-testing machine malfunctioned during a demonstration for
European drug maker Novartis, Holmes simply faked the test. Holmes and
her team completed a live, unsuccessful test in Europe but Theranos’ team
in California sent a fabricated result to Novartis as evidence of the
technology’s capability.95
Holmes also employed deception to dupe investors and business
partners. While the company claimed its blood analyzers were capable of
running more than 200 tests using just few drops of blood, in fact, the
readers often malfunctioned and Theranos routinely ran tests using
traditional machines made by competitors like Siemens.96 Balwani then
inflated the company’s financial projections to convince investors to give
more money at higher valuations.97 And so it went for years. The
company’s executives would use ineffective technology on patients,
misrepresent its capabilities to win over business partners, and use those
business deals (or sometimes wholly invented deals) to lure unsuspecting
investors.
92

See generally CARREYROU, supra note 78 (Wall Street Journal reporter John
Carreyrou’s account of efforts to investigate Theranos).
93
It is instructive that Theranos generated little press interest until it was
required to disclose a fundraising transaction in 2010. On July 8th, 2010, an
online publication, Xconomy, published a short article about Theranos' $45
million raise. There appears to be scant coverage of the startup until this point.
See Luke Timmerman, Theranos Raises $45M for Personalized Medicine,
XCONOMY (July 8, 2010), https://xconomy.com/sanfrancisco/2010/07/08/theranos-raises-45m-for-personalized-medicine/.
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Carreyrou, supra note 78.
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CARREYROU, supra note 78, at 3-7.
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Id. at 169.
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On February 4, 2014, a hedge fund purchased $96 million worth of Theranos
stock at $17 a share, setting the company’s valuation at $9 billion. Balwani
induced the hedge fund executives to buy the stock by sending a spreadsheet
with financial projections that were multiples of Theranos’ own internal
projections. See, CARREYROU, supra note 78, at 182.
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The company continued to perpetrate its fraud until 2018 when the
SEC formally charged Holmes and Balwani with securities fraud.98 The
company and its executives are now engulfed in lawsuits by regulators,
the Department of Justice, investors, blood-testing patients, business
partners, and even documentary filmmakers.99 In 2018, Theranos
announced it would dissolve.100

D. Theranos’ Victims
Before examining the regulatory solutions that may have prevented
Theranos’ fraud, it is important to first consider the harm Theranos caused
to corporate partners, the public, and investors.

1. More Than Just a Few Sophisticated Investors
A class action lawsuit filed in California reveals the unspoken truth in
private company fundraising: there are more investors than just those
listed on the capitalization table.101 In Colman v. Theranos, the investors
who sued Theranos for fraud, misrepresentation, and market manipulation
were not direct investors in the company.102 The class members were socalled “indirect investors,” or “investors who purchased interests in
entities that bought Theranos stock.”103
Although the district court ultimately denied the plaintiff's motion for
class certification, the ruling and the documents offered in support of the
action reveal the extensive trading in Theranos shares by direct investors
and indirect investors. The named plaintiff Robert Colman provides an
example of these transactions occurring in the private securities market.
“[F]rom January 2013 to October 2016, Theranos sold Series C–1 and C–

98

Press Release, Theranos, CEO Holmes, and Former President Balwani
Charged With Massive Fraud, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar.
14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-41.
99
See Partner Invs., L.P. v. Theranos, Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 129, *1; In re
Ariz. Theranos, Inc., Litig., 256 F. Supp. 3d 1009; Walgreen v. Theranos, Inc.,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117428; Colman v. Theranos, Inc., 325 F.R.D.
629; 2018 SEC LEXIS 752, *1.
100
Letter from David Taylor, CEO and General Counsel, Theranos, to Theranos
stockholders (Sept. 4, 2018); see also, Daniel Kass, The Bloody Saga That Made
Theranos Finally Call It Quits, LAW360.
101
Colman v. Theranos, 325 F.R.D. 629 (2018).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 634.
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2 Preferred Stock to over 30 individuals and investment entities.”104 Lucas
Venture Group XI, LLC was among that group, purchasing nearly half a
million Series C-1 shares for a little more than $7 million.105 The Lucas
fund was able to purchase these shares because it had its own investors
like Colman, who purchased interests in the fund.106 Colman, for example,
spent $500,000 to buy interests in the Lucas fund with the “express
purpose of making corresponding purchases of Theranos securities.”107
Colman was not alone; plaintiffs produced a list of more than 200
individuals who indirectly invested in at least twelve investment funds
with the purpose of financing purchases of Theranos shares.108 These
individuals’ investments ranged in size from $15,000 to more than $17
million.109
This lawsuit reveals private companies like Theranos are increasingly
financed by a variety of different investor types, not just venture capital
firms or institutional investors.110 As a result, the private-public securities
regulation framework appears outdated in the face of such a complicated
and expansive private fundraising universe, where hundreds of individuals
can indirectly invest in an unregulated private company through
investment funds and even trade those shares on a liquid secondary
exchange.

2. Corporate Partners Invest Millions
The Theranos fraud harmed more than its investors; Theranos formed
numerous partnerships with corporations—most notably Walgreens Boots
Alliance and Safeway Inc.—whose businesses suffered when the
partnerships failed to produce the expected gains. Like Theranos’
investors and customers, these business partners fell for the company’s
lofty promises of revolutionary technology and seemingly infinite
potential. When Theranos failed to deliver, however, these companies (and
their shareholders) suffered and in the case of Walgreens, customers’
health were put at risk.
Safeway, the grocery chain, spent at least four years and an incredible
$350 million building clinics so that it could offer Theranos' blood tests to
104

Id. at 635.
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Id. at 637.
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customers inside its grocery stores.111 Similarly, Walgreens formed a 2010
partnership with Theranos that eventually led to the drugstore chain
offering Theranos blood testing in as many as forty stores. In a subsequent
lawsuit, Walgreens sued Theranos for $140 million, which represented its
investment in the Theranos partnership. That figure also reportedly
included a convertible-debt note and investment in the company.112
Walgreens and Safeway staked their respective brands on the
promising technology Theranos pitched. Safeway even completed a
massive redesign of its stores to feature Theranos.113 But the blood tests
proved unreliable, customers complained of surprising test results, and
doctors began expressing their concerns about the accuracy of Theranos’
testing. Ultimately, both partnerships failed, costing Walgreens and
Safeway millions of dollars and potentially causing physical harm to
Walgreens’ customers.

3. Patients and the Unsuspecting Public
Importantly, Theranos’ partnership with Walgreens extended beyond
a financial investment. Like many Silicon Valley companies, the
technology was a work in progress and the company’s executives
exaggerated the products’ potential. But, unlike other Silicon Valley
companies, Theranos operated in the highly regulated biotechnology
industry and tested its faulty products on unsuspecting patients. Theranos
offered its blood tests to patients in multiple states, particularly Arizona—
the primary test market for the Walgreens-Theranos joint venture—and
even in Mexico. According to the Walgreens suit, in 2012, Theranos and
Walgreens formed a joint venture and Walgreens invested $140 million
into the startup.114 Under the partnership, Walgreens would offer
Theranos' blood tests at “Wellness Center” clinics in Arizona and
California.115 The plaintiffs in Walgreens suggest that Theranos, through
111

John Carreyrou, Safeway, Theranos Split After $350 Million Deal Fizzles,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2015) https://www.wsj.com/articles/safeway-theranossplit-after-350-million-deal-fizzles-1447205796.
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its partnership with Walgreens, tested thousands of patients, who were
essentially subjected to “beta testing” of an incomplete and unreliable
blood testing device.116 Indeed, Theranos was not adhering to industry
standards and its tests often produced results that were inconsistent with
traditional (and more reliable) blood testing.117 Many patients received
alarming results from faulty Theranos blood tests.118
It is tempting to consider Theranos as an outlier among startups
because most unicorns operate in industries that seem to pose a lower risk
of physical harm to the public, such as e-commerce and internet
software.119 But the reality is that many of the more than 400 unicorns
interact with the public in ways similar to Theranos and, in at least a few
cases, with the potential for great public harm.120 23andMe is a
biotechnology startup that offers direct-to-consumer genetic testing. Uber
and Lyft employ millions of drivers, transport millions more riders, and
both companies have experimented with self-driving cars. Airbnb arranges
for homeowners across the world to rent their residences to strangers.121
At its peak, WeWork employed 12,500 workers122 and managed a $50
116

Id. at 1021.
Journalist John Carreyrou recounts his experience personally testing
Theranos’ device with a doctor against a traditional LabCorp blood test. The
results were significantly different and, as with many Theranos patients,
suggested alarming health problems from high blood pressure to Addison’s
disease. See, CARREYROU, supra note 52, at 232-236.
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See Christopher Weaver, Agony, Alarm and Anger for People Hurt by
Theranos’s Botched Blood Tests, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2016 9:52 PM),
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medication as a result).
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The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic provided a stark example of the scope of
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billion portfolio of office leases.123 Its largest investor, SoftBank, has
invested more than $12 billion into the company, providing an object
lesson in the risks of investing in young high-risk companies.124 These are
just a few of the more than 400 unicorns and many more private companies
with sub-$1 billion valuations offer the public services with little oversight
or disclosures.

IV. THE NEED TO REGULATE PRIVATE COMPANIES
A. An Anomaly or a Sign of What is to Come?
Theranos is, in some ways, an anomaly. A number of factors
exacerbated the fraud: a compelling narrative largely accepted by the
media; an extraordinary board of directors who inspired investor and
public confidence in the company but lacked the skepticism or relevant
experience to fulfill its oversight duties; seemingly insatiable investor
appetite for high-growth technology companies; a charismatic leader who
enjoyed little resistance from inside or outside the company; a lax medical
regulatory regime that was repeatedly fooled by Theranos’ smoke and
mirrors; and a total lack of scrutiny by securities regulators. While some
of these factors may emerge again in another private company, it seems
unlikely that a similar set of circumstances will occur with such regularity
as to require a broad reform to the private capital markets.
But several important factors support changing the current regulatory
regime: (1) the private investment market continues to grow; (2) private
companies have, in turn, grown in size, scope, and valuation; (3) there is
ample evidence that even sophisticated and/or institutional investors are
vulnerable to fraud; (4) as Theranos showed, unpoliced private companies
pose serious risks to the broader investing public—not just accredited
https://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2020/04/30/wework-unravelingcontinues-with-new-layoff-round/#7d420e923581 (discussing WeWork’s
downsizing amid the COVID-19 crisis).
123
Joy Wiltermuth, Here’s a look at how WeWork’s $50 billion pile of office
leases could unravel, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 14, 2019 4:03 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-a-look-at-how-weworks-50-billionpile-of-office-leases-could-unravel-2019-10-10.
124
SoftBank to write down WeWork by $6.6 billion, compounding portfolio
misery, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2020 6:09 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/softbank-to-write-down-wework-by-6point6billion-compounding-portfolio-misery.html (reporting SoftBank’s multi-billiondollar losses on its WeWork investment).
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investors and institutions; (5) reforms to protect investors are feasible and
not unduly burdensome on companies.

B. Possible Regulatory Reforms
1. Require Unicorns to Disclose Certain Financial Information
Theranos was able to pull off an elaborate fraud with remarkable ease.
As a private company, Theranos needed only to persuade enough wealthy
investors to take the company at its word. Unlike public companies,
Theranos’ did not certify its financial projections; unrestrained, its
executives grossly inflated the company’s numbers. Drawn in by lofty
numbers and unsubstantiated promises, investors poured millions of
dollars into Theranos, valuing the company at $9 billion. Troublingly,
Theranos raised the funds without making any substantial financial
disclosures to the SEC.
Theranos is not alone in this respect; unicorns routinely raise millions
of dollars in funding rounds without offering investors the type of
exhaustive disclosures that public companies must regularly submit to the
public.125 Many companies justify this reluctance to share information
with investors as protecting trade secrets, proprietary technology, or
competitive advantages. But the truth is that companies have little
financial incentive to share information unless a securities law mandates
disclosure.126 This has led some to propose revising the securities law
framework to require greater disclosure of at least some private
companies.127
One such proposal by University of Washington School of Law
Professor Jennifer S. Fan would require unicorns to share their restated
certificate of incorporation publicly and make the company's up-to-date
financial information available to all stockholders and employees, rather
than just major investors.128 Under this “hybrid disclosure” system, a
unicorn would have to disclose this otherwise private information to key
stakeholders within ninety days of closing a financing valuing the
125

See Fan, supra note 77, at 587-88 (discussing the ubiquity of unicorns and
the ease by which private companies secure millions of dollars in financing); de
Fontenay, supra note 17, at 448 (“Today, private companies can raise ample,
cheap capital with relative ease.”).
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company at $1 billion or more (the unicorn threshold).129 Setting the
threshold at $1 billion valuation may be somewhat arbitrary, but setting
the threshold too low risks overburdening startups and smaller companies
that could not afford to comply with even a modest disclosure system.
Some larger private companies already provide audited financials to their
investors, suggesting that established businesses are capable and even
willing to participate in a system like this.130
The hybrid disclosure system is incomplete unless there is a thirdparty auditing requirement. Otherwise, Theranos—and other similarly
inclined unicorns—could evade detection by exaggerating or
misrepresenting its disclosed financials. Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley was
passed partly as a reaction to the accounting scandals and securities fraud
of the 1990s and early 2000s (namely, Enron and Worldcom), which
showed that corporate executives were willing and able to exaggerate,
manipulate, and blatantly lie to deceive investors.131 Similarly, Theranos
executives consistently showed a willingness to lie to investors, the media,
and the public about the company’s financial health and its technology.
Any disclosure system aimed at preventing fraud and protecting investors
must have a mechanism whereby a disinterested third party verifies the
company’s financial statements and disclosures.
A mandatory unicorn disclosure system like the one Professor Fan
proposes would undoubtedly receive pushback from unicorns but
improved financial transparency would benefit all investors in the long
run132 and alleviate some of the problems unicorns face.133

2. Certification of Financials and Operations
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de Fontenay, supra note 17, at 480–81 (“Larger private companies often
choose to be audited regularly and disclose their financial statements to at least
some subset of their investors.”).
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Indeed, America’s regulatory system is premised on the notion that,
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substantial decrease in mega-round financings.” Fan, supra note 77, at 640-641.
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The hybrid disclosure system should also require executives to review
and certify the financial information provided to investors, similar to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s certification requirement. Under SOX, corporate
executives must review and certify the company’s annual and quarterly
reports. Executives at private companies, however, operate without this
liability and therefore feel little pressure to investigate or question the
validity of financial statements and projections. At Theranos, for example,
Holmes and Balwani misled investors with inflated revenue projections
and fictitious sales agreements with pharmaceutical companies.134
Balwani provided investors with wholly fabricated financial projections
that had no basis in reality—and therefore could have easily been exposed
by a third-party audit. Requiring executives at unicorns to review and
certify financial projections rightly places the burden of verifying the
numbers on the company.
In the event that a company like Theranos defrauds investors, the
certification requirement provides strong proof that the executivesignatories were aware of the company’s financial health, making it easier
to hold these executives liable for any misrepresentations.135 Thus, this
certification requirement would expose executives to civil and even
criminal liability if they knowingly certified figures they knew to be false.
In the case of Theranos, for example, Balwani may not have chosen to
reject the corporate controller’s lower figures if he knew that he, as well
as other Theranos executives, would have to personally acknowledge that
the figures contained no omissions or misrepresentations.
On its own, a SOX-like certification requirement would not
sufficiently address the problem, but it would be a powerful reminder to
the corporate executive that she is exposing herself to civil and criminal
liability if she knowingly misrepresents the company’s financial health.
Further, the certification will aid law enforcement seeking to hold those
executives accountable once the fraud is exposed. Finally, certification
will give private litigants strong evidence against companies and
executives.
3. Disclosing Transactions in the Private Securities Market
The SEC could impose mandatory disclosures for all private securities
transactions. While this may seem radical, the SEC adopted a rule
proposed by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in 2013
134
135

See CARREYROU, supra note 52, at 7-8, 49-50, 182-83.
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that required dissemination of certain Rule 144A transactions.136 The
purpose of this rule was to improve price transparency in these
transactions, which, in turn, would “enhance pre-trade price discovery,
foster more competitive pricing, reduce costs to investors and assist market
participants in determining the quality of their executions.”137 The SEC
and FINRA also predicted that the dissemination would “improve the
quality of the valuation of securities and derivative positions for publicly
issued securities of the Securities Act Rule 144A issuer and for similar
securities.”138 A similar rule change with respect to applicable Rule 144A
equity transactions and Regulation D exempt transactions could
dramatically increase transparency in the secondary market. Such a move
would not only increase market efficiency, but it would have the added
benefit of arming investors with up-to-date information on pre-IPO
companies.

V. Conclusion
Financial regulatory reforms are rarely popular. History has shown,
high-profile financial scandals often act as a catalyst for legislative
interest, regulatory attention, and, occasionally, substantial regulatory
reforms. The Great Depression and the notorious Wall Street “bucket
shops” led to the Pecora hearings and the passage of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act.139 The Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, a systemic
banking crisis involving more than a thousand thrift banks, led to the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989.140
The corporate finance scandals and bankruptcies of the early 2000s, most
notably Enron Corporation and WorldCom, shined a light on corporate
greed and galvanized legislative support for Sarbanes-Oxley.141 The Great
Recession and the sub-prime-loan-fueled housing collapse ushered in
substantial financial reforms (namely, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) of 2010). The financial
wrongdoing also led to widespread protests and public hearings, such as
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, where Senator
Carl Levin memorably excoriated Goldman Sachs witnesses for profiting
136
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during the financial crisis while the bank’s clients lost money.142 But still,
regulatory reform is never easy; even the reforms passed after the 1929
crash and the housing collapse of 2007 faced substantial pushback.143
Theranos may prove to be a watershed moment for securities
regulation, but, now more than three years after the company unraveled,
there is little reason to expect the type of legislative response that followed
the historical financial scandals. More likely, Theranos will be the canary
in the coal mine, warning investors, regulators, and the public of the
dangers of ever-growing unregulated private companies. The type of
reforms discussed in this Note, such as requiring unicorns to disclose
material information to regulators and the public, would represent
important steps toward transparency and could prevent future frauds from
ascending to the heights that Theranos reached. The seismic shift in the
capital markets away from publicly listed companies and toward private
ownership demands regulatory solution to promote market stability and
protect investors.
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